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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Conscience
Monsignor John Tracy Ellis has joined
the ranks of those experts participating in
the current dialogue on the subject of conscience and religious commitment. Writing
in the June 1964 issue of The Catholic
Mind, Monsignor Ellis states, in part, that
the present problem in this area does not
lie with the attitude and policy of the American bishops, their priests and the public,
about either the theory or the practical implementation of Church-State relations. It
lies rather with the traditional teaching of
some Catholic theologians on this question,
a position which, to most men outside the
Church and to a strong minority within, appears as unalterable. It is traceable to the
failure of the Church of our day to set at
rest, by an authoritative pronouncement,
the uneasiness which thousands of wellintentioned men outside the Catholic fold
feel because they know how the historic link
between altar and throne has so frequently
in the past meant either complete deprivation of the religious rights of non-Catholics
or their greatly restricted exercise.
Happily, a change has been gradually
unfolding in Catholic theological circles on
this all-important question. Historians of
theology may well date its rise to the publication a half century ago of the work of
the great Jesuit theologian, Arthur Vermeersch, La Tolgrance (Louvain, 1912).
From Vermeersch's pioneer effort there
stemmed a line of argument that can be
traced through succeeding decades to a remarkable essay of Father Yves de la Bri~re,

of 1935, in which that learned Jesuit stated
that the psychological and moral conditions
of contemporary society demand, in what
he described as "the name of public tranquility and the public interest," that the
legal freedom of all religions be recognized
everywhere as a "universal rule of civilization." Yves de la Bri~re, S.J., "A Propos
de la Tol6rance Civile," Miscellanea Vermeersch, Scritti Pubblicati in onore del R.
P. Arturo Vermeersch, S.!. II, 182-83
(Rome, 1935). See also the excellent summary of Catholic teaching in A. F. Carrillo
de Albornoz, Catholicism and Religious
Liberty (Geneva, 1959); and Eric D'Arcy,
Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (New
York, 1961).
Only four years ago Giacomo Cardinal
Lercaro, Archbishop of Bologna, traced in
a remarkable essay the teaching of the
Church on the subject of religious freedom,
while at the same time he was at pains to
differentiate it from the tenets of philosophical liberalism. With engaging candor the
Cardinal proceeded to delineate the views
of the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on controversial themes
like the Inquisition, to face up bravely to
the stem pronouncements of Popes Gregory
XVI and Pius IX against the idea of religious liberty, and to explain the distinction
of more recent theologians between the
"thesis" of the ideal situation of Church and
State and the "hypothesis" of the order of
real life.
In describing the circumstances out of
which arose the often embarrassing facts of
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Catholic history in this regard, the Cardinal
maintained that the problem of religious
freedom itself is a relatively modern one
that necessitates the careful distinguishing
between what are the defined and unchanging doctrines of the Church and what he has
called "the impact [that] given historical
situations have made on the Church." For
the Cardinal of Bologna the freedom necessary for the act of faith is sufficient theological basis for the Catholic doctrine of religious liberty. The seal of approval for this
teaching was bestowed by the highest authority in the Church when Pope John
XXIII stated in Pacem in Terris:
Every human being has the right to honor
God according to the dictates of an upright
conscience, and therefore the right to worship God privately and publicly.
Augustin Cardinal Bea, president of the
Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity,
last year made known his personal commitment to the principle of religious freedom
which he particularized in unmistakable
terms. "This freedom," said the Cardinal,
means the right of man to decide freely, and
according to his own conscience, regarding
his own destiny. From this freedom is born
the right and duty of man to follow his own
conscience. It is the duty of the individual,
and of society, to respect this freedom and
this right that man has to decide for himself.
Augustin Cardinal Bea, "The Truth in Charity," Catholic Mind, LXI 57 (March, 1963).
There is no equivocation in these words,
no subtlety that may either conceal or confuse man's wish to understand precisely
what Cardinal Bea had in mind. It is heartening to recall that it is he who has officially
sponsored this teaching, and that this highly
respected member of the Roman Curia has
promised to stand sponsor for this vital formula in the Council.
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Needless to say, according to Monsignor
Ellis, the issue of religious freedom is a
complicated one which is easy to oversimplify. Many historians have thus pictured the Catholic Church as the stubborn
foe of human freedom; many, too, would
contend that if it is only now that the
Church has begun to see the necessity to
relax its rigidity in this regard, it is but a
matter of expediency. But this is a false and
misleading way to read the Church's record.
For more than once in major crises of mankind's troubled passage through this world,
it has been the Catholic Church alone that
has stood as a bulwark against the inroads
of tyranny and oppression.

Lawyer Saints
The February 1964 issue of the American Bar Association Journal contains an
extremely interesting and informative article by James K. Gaynor on the patron
saints of the legal profession. Five men who
were successful in the legal profession of
their day stand out as saints. The author
recalls these men and tells us something
about each.
Ambrose was born in Gaul, probably in
340, and grew to manhood in a political atmosphere. He became a barrister in Rome
and was successful in both law and politics.
He was appointed governor of two provinces with headquarters in what is now
Milan.
At that time, only six decades after the
persecution of Christians had ceased, Christianity had for all practical purposes become the official state religion of Rome. The
secular authorities took a deep interest in
the affairs of the Church, and when an assembly was called in 374 to elect a bishop,
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Ambrose attended in an effort to bring unity
among two contending factions. He was
only a catechumen; he had not yet been received officially into the Church. Nevertheless, he delivered a stirring speech.
It was not unusual at that time for a person not an ordained priest to be named
bishop, and spontaneously a cry arose, "Let
us elect Ambrose!" He was selected by acclamation.
One might expect a layman, wise in the
way of politics, to administer ably but give
secondary attention to spiritual considerations. But not Ambrose: he was ordained,
apportioned his money among the poor,
settled his lands upon the Church and devoted his life to pastoral duties. He died on
Good Friday in 397.
That sham was not involved in the life of
St. Ambrose was evidenced by his part in
the conversion of St. Augustine. The latter,
whose Confessions and City of God have
been best sellers through the years, hardly
would have been swayed by one who was
wanting in sincerity.
Many years later, in 1252, there was
born at Kermartin in Brittany one Ervoan
H61ory. The Latin shortening of his Celtic
name was "Ivo" and the French form
"Yves." It is from the Anglicized form of
the latter that the name "Yves" comes to us.
Ivo went to Paris and became a successful lawyer. He became a judge in the ecclesiastical courts, first at Rennes, then at Treguier. Ordained a priest in 1284, he became
a defender of the innocent and came to be
known as "the poor man's advocate." He
died on May 19, 1303, and was canonized
in 1347.
The story of the swallows of Capistrano,
which return to the same mission church in
California on March 19 each year, is a familiar one. The patron of that church was a

practicing lawyer and public official before
embracing the religious life.
John was born in 1386 at Capistrano, a
small town in the Abruzzi, which then was
a part of the Kingdom of Naples. He studied
at Perugia and became a successful lawyer.
In 1412 he was appointed Governor of
Perugia.
In 1416 he turned to the religious life;
some accounts say that it was because of
the death of his wife, others that it resulted
from meditation while a prisoner of war
during a local conflict.
John joined the Franciscan Order and
was ordained a priest in 1420. His life as a
religious was both eventful and turbulent,
culminating in the preaching of the crusade
prior to the time of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks.
Early in 1456 the Turks were advancing
to lay siege to Belgrade and John exhausted
himself in preaching and exhorting the Hungarian people to meet the threatened danger.
The siege was finally abandoned and Western Europe for the time was saved, but John
fell victim to infection from thousands of
unburied corpses and died on October 23,
1456.
The mission of San Juan Capistrano,
founded by Father Junipero Serra in 1776,
still stands not many miles south of Los
Angeles, honoring the lawyer-turned-priest,
St. John Capistrano.
Sir Thomas More was not a priest or a
monastic. He was a brilliant lawyer who became the first layman to serve as Lord
Chancellor of England, succeeding the deposed Cardinal Wolsey.
Born in London in 1478, he was admitted
to Lincoln's Inn in 1496 and was sitting in
Parliament by 1504. A favorite of Henry
VIII, he was expected to support the king
in his desire for a divorce from Catherine
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when he was raised to the chancellorship.
Instead, he was deposed and sentenced to
the Tower.
After a brilliant defense at his trial for
treason in which he represented himself, he
was convicted and beheaded on July 7,
1535. "I die the King's loyal servant, but
first God's," he is quoted as having said as
he faced execution.
The son of Don Joseph dei Liguori, captain of the royal galleys, Alphonsus was
born near Naples in 1696. He began studying jurisprudence at age thirteen and, by
special dispensation required because of his
age, was permitted to present himself at the
University of Naples, for the doctor's degree in both civil and canon law when he
was seventeen.
The degree was granted by acclamation
and it has been said that in eight years of
law practice, he never lost a case.
After ten years at the bar, Alphonsus
passionately argued a case involving an estate of great value only to learn that he had
overlooked the deciding point of law. Conceding the error, he walked from the courtroom, abandoned the law and entered the
religious life.
Alphonsus formed the Redemptorist Order and wrote a well-known work, Moral
Theology. His life as a priest extended over
a period of forty-eight years.
Mr. Gaynor points out that other lawyers
have become saints, but less is known about
them.
In the fourth century, when the Roman
Empire still dominated the political world,
a barrister was elected Bishop of Antioch
in 319 and served until his death in 324,
after having been imprisoned for confessing
the faith. Little more is known of him, but
he is venerated as St. Philogonius.
In the same century another lawyer, a
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brother of St. Ambrose, assisted in the administration of the diocese of Milan. He remained a layman and appears not even to
have been baptized until rescued after having been shipwrecked. The remainder of his
life, marked by sanctity, makes him memorable as St. Satyrus.
In the sixth century one of the highest
judicial offices of Orleans was abandoned
by Liefard when he was forty. He became
a monk and developed a great monastery
at Meung-sur-Loire. He is better known to
us today as St. Liphardus, who died about
550.
Although the legal profession has had an
ample number of representatives from
which to choose, those generally recognized
as patron saints of lawyers are St. Ives, St.
Thomas More and St. Genesius. Little is
known about St. Genesius. He was not a
lawyer but the clerk of a court in Aries in
the second century; he refused to record
sacrilegious testimony.
There are two patron saints for jurists:
St. John Capistrano and St. Catharine of
Alexandria. Tried before the Emperor
Maxentius early in the fourth century, St.
Catharine is reported to have vanquished
fifty philosophers who opposed her defense
of Christianity.
Civil Rights Act
Adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
creates important new rights and obligations
for employers, employees, unions, employment agencies, hotel and restaurant owners,
public officials, and minority group members. To clarify these rights and obligations,
a new operations manual has recently been
published, entitled The Civil Rights Act of
1964. It explains the most important sections and the new pattern of federal-state
relationships established by the Act.
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Prepared by the Editorial Staff of The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides authoritative
and detailed information on the background, interpretation, coverage, and enforcement of the Fair Employment Practices, Public Accommodations, and Federal
Assistance Titles of the Act. Written in
clear non-technical language, this operations manual is a practical handbook dealing with activities under these three Titles of
the new law.
Part I of The Civil Rights Act of 1964
discusses and analyzes the Federal Fair Employment Practices Title-the much-discussed Title VII-against its extensive background of executive orders, state laws, and
municipal ordinances. It points out what
this Title will mean to employers, unions,
employment agencies, employees, and the
states, and how it was developed by Congress. In another chapter the Title's coverage and exemptions are discussed. Specific
types of discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations,
and discrimination in apprenticeship, training, and re-training programs are carefully
detailed by defining the use of the standards
of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin.
A particularly important chapter in Part
I tells how Title VII will be administered
and enforced by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as to the investigation of discrimination charges, enforcement proceedings, posting requirements,
rules, regulations, and studies. Completing
this Part is coverage of union contract restrictions on discrimination, how arbitrators
have construed these restrictions, and how
state laws have dealt with discrimination.
Part II begins with "Public Accommodations," describing the scope of the new fed-

eral statute outlawing "white only" policies
in hotels, motels, restaurants, lunch counters, theaters, and other places of accommodation and entertainment. This is not the
first such federal statute; a Reconstruction
measure adopted in 1875 was declared unconstitutional eight years later. The history
of this law and the common-law duty of
innkeepers, as well as enforcement by the
states of public-accommodation laws forbidding racial discrimination, are analyzed
to provide the background of the new legislation.
Thoroughly explained in this section are
the types of establishments which are covered by the new federal law, what is
expected of them in the way of nondiscriminatory treatment of customers, and what
types of legal actions can be brought against
them for violations of the Act.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 then takes
up the Federal Assistance Title of the Act,
which strikes down discrimination on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin in
connection with programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. This
Title - Title VI - directs the federal departments and agencies concerned to take
necessary steps to carry out this policy.
These chapters trace the legislative history of the Federal Assistance Title and its
relationship with existing executive orders
relating to nondiscrimination in construction and housing. The coverage of the Title,
the method and conditions under which regulations are promulgated, how appeals can
be taken, and the effect of the section on
employers are set forth fully.
Of special interest here is the list of those
federally-assisted programs which the Justice Department considers subject to the
provisions of this Title, including aid to education, public welfare grants, and vocational
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rehabilitation. The discussion of the provision limiting the cut-off of funds for discrimination in connection with a federallyassisted program to the particular locality
involved also merits careful attention. In
addition, specific consideration is given to
the section of Title VI which underscores
the policy of the federal government to
abolish employment discrimination in programs aimed primarily at creating jobs.
Completing the comprehensive coverage
of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the Appendix, which includes such reference aids
as the text of the entire Act, the House
Committee Report (there is no Senate Committee Report), and extensive excerpts from
congressional debate. The book is fully
indexed.
(Copies of The Civil Rights Act of 1964
may be ordered from BNA Incorporated,
1231 24th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20037 at $9.50 per copy, $8.50 paperbound.)
Business Ethics
The America Press of 920 Broadway,
New York City, recently published an excellent brochure on the subject of ethics of
the businessman and the need for clear
codes in this area. Written in part by William Byron, S.J., the brochure establishes
that if businessmen want to help improve
the level of business conduct, they should
first understand and accept the fundamental
ideas of natural law morality.
But as cases become more entwined in
the machinery of production and marketing,
and farther removed from the simple blackand-white areas of traditional morality, a
consensus becomes much harder to establish. This is why so many businessmen complain: "It is more difficult to know what is
right than it is to do it."
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The industry-wide ethical practice code is
probably the best solution to the need for
information on what is right and wrong in
modern business dealings. The self-enforcement idea sounds good in speeches but
looks bad in history. It simply doesn't work.
Many businessmen are interested in seeing meaningful codes of business ethics
written for individual enterprises. They are
almost totally opposed to the idea of letting
the federal government draw up such codes
and police them. The general preference is
to have top-management men, and all who
contribute to company policy, get together
with their counterparts throughout the industry and hammer out a workable set of
ethical ground rules. They want the code to
be specific.
Businessmen are practical men and thus
uniquely fitted to the task of carrying forward the initial consensus to meet the complex collection of ethical dilemmas found
in the market place. In other words, the
same human nature that once lied, stole or
murdered without finesse in the unadorned
cave, can now lie, steal and murder in any
number of more sophisticated ways in the
swank executive suite. The new environment is so complicated, and the new techniques so advanced, that the liar, thief or
murderer can pass unnoticed by ordinary
people. Often enough, even he does not recognize himself for what he is. Only those
who know both their ethics and their way
around the competitive business jungle will
recognize the offender and the offense. Only
the business expert - the top management
man - can write it all up in a code.
Difficulties repeatedly crop up when you
try to be specific in these matters. That is
why so few realistic codes have been written. Every businessman knows that stealing
another man's property is wrong; but will
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all agree that a man's job, or the promotion
to which he is clearly entitled, constitutes
property?
The same difficulty turns up in medicine
and law. Murder is always wrong, but doctors share no consensus that abortion is
always murder. Lawyers must not advertise,
but does the publication of one's courtroom
conquests constitute advertising? As cases
become more specific, the consensus weakens. But it is precisely in the area of specific
cases that businessmen seek the direction
and protection of a code.
Generally, the industry groups and trade
associations are less specific than individual
companies in cataloguing business right and
wrong. There are two ways of looking at
this. The more people involved in drawing
up an ethical standard, the more difficult it
is to get a consensus. The greater the number of companies falling under a code, the
more diverse are the situations that must be
covered, thus making the job more difficult
from the outset.
On the other hand, industry-wide codes
will be more easily composed and more
readily accepted once the idea of each company having a clear and specific ethical
standard catches on. In effect, this means
that the businessman of good will, who happens to enjoy an influential post in a given
company, can really do something about
improving the ethical climate of American
business right now.
Father Byron concludes that the daily
test of upholding a code challenges the personal integrity of everyone from top to bottom of the enterprise. Meeting this challenge
is one way of strengthening personal morality and individual initiative. Some might
argue that man's freedom, dignity and personal moral development would be better
advanced if he were not bound to a code

imposed by his company or trade association. His conduct would be more noble if he
were not watched by those responsible for
enforcing the code.
This argument is unrealistic according to
Father Byron. It overlooks or ignores the
fact that we are all creatures of our environment. The practice of virtue can be difficult
and, at times, almost impossible if personal
ideals must buck the trend of public practice. This is why "ethical climate" is a good
expression. An improved climate makes for
better ethical conduct on the part of those
who must live, breathe and work within it.
Every new code of business ethics will demonstrate how serious American business
is about improving that climate. The specificity of each code will be a clue to the courage that produced it.
Model Penal Code
The April 1963 issue of the Notre Dame
Lawyer contains an excellent critique of the
1962 Official Draft of the Model Penal
Code proposed by the American Law Institute. The general areas discussed are (1)
abortion, (2) statutory rape, (3) arson, (4)
theft, (5) disorderly conduct, and (6) vagrancy.
In discussing the Code's liberal position
in these six areas the comment attempts to
consider each with a view to the degree of
respect which it reflects for human life
and the sanctity of the person involved.
Possibly the clearest example of the
drafters' concern for one's welfare and integrity is its extensive revision of the law of
abortion. By enlarging the ambit of justifiable abortion, the Code has protected the
woman in danger of health or in danger of
bringing into life a being unwanted because
of the circumstances resulting in its conception. It is ironic, however, that in thus
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endeavoring to protect one life, that of the
mother, the Code has sanctioned the taking
of another life, viz., that of the unborn
child. What appears at first blush to be a
concern for human life, on second glance is
seen to be no more than a selection of which
of two lives is the more worthy of protection.
Furthermore, it would appear that in
lowering the age of consent in the area of
rape, the Institute has indicated a degree of
disregard for the protection of a young
woman's inviolability. Surely, it would seem
that most still consider a ten-year-old girl's
virtue important enough to prevent her immature "consent" from being operative to
excuse her attackers from a prosecution for
rape, and to thereby encourage future perpetration of such assaults on the young.
It might be thought also that by the removal of the technical distinctions in the
areas of arson and theft, the Institute has
neglected individual well-being by placing a
higher premium on the welfare of the citizenry to the detriment of the accused. However, in these areas, the Code has properly
protected the public while not minimizing
the rights of the individual accused. For
example, the old common-law distinction
of a dwelling house as opposed to other
structures recognized the inherent dangers
to an occupied structure. The Institute has
retained this principle, but has codified it so
as to reflect more accurately these dangers
as they are present today in our more mobile
and transient society. Thus, the law should
not recognize, nor would the Code purport
to recognize, any distinction which does not
in fact reflect accurately the possible consequences of a wrongful incendiary act. This
is not to say that the rights of the accused
are in any way prejudiced. Whether the object of his act has been an individual's home
or other structure in which he might happen
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to be present, the essential guilt of the actor
is the same.
Similarly, the distinction between larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining money
by false pretenses - crimes generally involving the same degree of culpability should not prevent the prosecution of the
perpetrator of such acts. The only dangers
which might arise from a consolidation of
such offenses is a possible failure to notify
the accused of the crime for which he is
being prosecuted. However, by reason of
the specific provisions in the Code, the possibility of such danger is slight. Fair trial of
the accused is insured by the provision empowering the court to grant a continuance
or other appropriate relief where substantial
prejudice might result from the possible
effects of consolidation. In light of this provision, the substantive and administrative
benefits derived should far outweigh any
imagined prejudices.
The rights involved in the discussion of
vagrancy and disorderly conduct, of course,
derive their validity from the Constitution.
The Institute was obviously cautious in its
drafting of these sections so as not to transgress upon them. However, the comment
suggests that the recognition of these rights,
fundamental to any penal code, must be
kept in perspective. If not, the individual
conduct will be protected only at the expense of the public welfare. It is doubtful if
the Code has reached a proper balance between these two competing interests.
Obscenity and Free Speech
The first of a two-part treatise dealing
with obscenity and constitutional freedom
appears in the Spring 1964 issue of the
St. Louis University Law Journal. Coauthored by Dean M. Slough and P. D.
McAnany, S.J., the second installment will
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appear in the Summer issue of that Journal.
Following an extensive historical treatment of the subject, the authors attempt an
analysis of Mr. Justice Brennan's and Mr.
Justice Harlan's working philosophy on
obscenity.
According to the article, in his search for
integrity of the initial decision Mr. Justice
Brennan has championed a series of procedural measures which insist on the full
judicial process for any obscenity determination. Starting with the necessity of a jury
determination in all obscenity cases, he has
added other requirements. In Smith v. California, his majority opinion found a Los
Angeles ordinance wanting because it contained no scienter clause. It was not the fact
that the state could not place strict requirements on individuals, even in the area of
speech, but that this could not result in an
encroachment on protected expression. Obscenity indeed could be controlled, but only
after it had been determined by full judicial
process that such items were obscene. Not
every method of control was legitimate since
the knife's edge between protected and unprotected allowed for no leeway at all. The
self-censorship imposed (or at least encouraged) by law in California made the bookseller's decision pre-judicial and open to
serious encroachments on protected areas
of expression.
Again, in the Bantam Books case, Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion turns on the protection of the initial judgment of obscenity
by judicial process. There an administrative
decision that was non-judicial in nature was
substituted by the bookseller for his own
judgment (as in the Smith case) or for the
judgment of a fully judicial trial. To be sure,
there was no physical or legal constraint,
but the tendency of the factual situation
pointed toward a non-integral determination

of the obscenity issue and the concommitant
invasion of possible areas of protected
speech. In Marcus v. Search Warrant, there
was unanimity in the Court because there
the initial decision was not only pre-judicial
and non-jury, but occurred on the mere suspicion of already suspicious police officers.
A final gloss on his obscenity doctrine can
be gained from his long concurrence in
Manual Enterprisesv. Day, where the issue
discussed was the factual one of whether
Congress had actually granted the Post Office Department the powers of determining
the obscene nature of items to be mailed.
Behind Mr. Justice Brennan's negative conclusion lies the feeling that any such power
belongs primarily to courts of law, where
proceedings before a jury are carefully
guarded by uniform regulations and are
open to review.
To summarize the Brennan-obscenityjurisprudence, according to the authors one
might say that the central issue is who
made the initial decision and when. If obscene speech is unprotected and subject to
full government control, all other speech
(libel, of course, excepted) is fully protected.
State and federal governments are equally
bound by the first amendment, and there
seem few restrictions in the Brennan universe which could be justified. This black/
white situation demands as accurate and
early a determination of the obscenity issue
as is possible. But if the restrictions are rigorous outside the obscenity area, there is a
lenience in the Brennan view toward the
control of items once the jury has spoken.
For it would appear that Mr. Justice Brennan leaves the decision as to what is obscene
to the countrymen of the jury. Once they
have, in full trial and with due knowledge of
the proper standards, made their judgment,
then the matter is closed. There will be ex-
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ceptions to this general rule, to be sure, for
Mr. Justice Brennan does not abdicate judicial reivew altogether; but by and large
there is no friendly interest in the case-bycase review as proposed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and adopted by Mr. Justice
Harlan. Clearly, for Mr. Justice Brennan,
obscenity is a matter for the common good
sense of the average man, helped in his decision by eleven of his peers.
The opposing philosophy has been articulated by Mr. Justice Harlan. His general
thesis can be stated as a balance-of-interest
approach, more akin to the general technique at the heart of the original clear-andpresent-danger test. This theme was enunciated in his Roth opinion and has been
reinforced by each addition since. In this
first obscenity decision the balancing is
most explicit, and later cases draw their
meaning from the earlier one. Since every
restriction on speech must be justified by a
competing social interest of relatively
greater importance, any decision to suppress this expression must be judged in its
full existential context of interest-danger
circumstances. The protection of public
morals lies with the several states by right;
and this right has been exercised in the passage of various obscenity laws, based on the
not irrational judgment that obscenity is
harmful to the public welfare. But since
each suppression of speech requires a constitutional judgment involving a balance of
interests, the determination must be individual. In order to insure against an inaccurate assessment of these multiple factors at
the primary level, appellate courts should
review the decision de novo, in effect remaking the same inquiry and judgment that any
constitutional determination demands. In
Roth itself this individualized balance resulted first in a different set of standards for
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state and federal control, and secondly in
differing results when applied to the items
before the Court.
Since Roth Mr. Justice Harlan has pursued the same patterned approach. Kingsley
Pictures v. Regents was an opportunity to
emphasize the importance of independent
review, for by an artful use of it the Court
could save an item of expression without invalidating the state statute. This same concern for judicial respect of state action in
balance with freedom of expression was
manifested in Smith v. California, where a
Los Angeles ordinance without a scienter
clause, for the punishment of selling obscenity, was found wanting by the Brennan majority. For Mr. Justice Harlan the fault lay
not with the ordinance itself, but with the
trial procedure in applying it. Again in
Manual Enterprises and Bantam Books the
emphasis was on leaving the federal government and Rhode Island with their means of
control while turning back a particular application of it.
To point up the contrast between the
Harlan and Brennan philosophies on obscene speech, the authors suggest that the
former does not care when or who decides
the obscenity issue, but how. Any judgment
that decides to control this particular speech
must take into account not so much whether
it is obscene or not, but whether the conflicting interests of freedom and protection of
public morality are carefully counter-balanced. It is a matter of degree, and the difficulty of coming to a constitutional judgment
demands that the decision be remade at
various levels of review. This puts a burden
on the appellate courts to police the efforts
of lower courts in this matter, but it also
provides a particularized protection of both
interests at stake. Although there should be
a test for judging when an object is obscene
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or not, its application must itself be a constitutional judgment. Triers of fact are not
always aware of the full dimensions of the
problem of free expression and have to be
checked out by minds more accustomed to
such nice distinctions as first amendment
litigation demands. Obscenity is not protected, but the state is justified in its control
of it only by bringing forward an interest
which in each case outweighs the suppression sought.
Good Samaritan Statutes
Legislation exempting physicians, and
quite frequently others, from liability and
civil damage for negligence while rendering
emergency treatment has been the subject of
several good articles in current law journals.
The Summer issue of the De Paul Law Review features a comment that discusses the
impact of this legislation on the law of torts
and makes a comparative study of the state
enactments which, in one form or another,
have appeared within the last five years in
over half of the states.
According to this comment the importance and popularity of such legislation are
apparent when it is considered that thirtytwo states during 1963 entertained bills or
amendments to existing laws designed to
afford civil liability immunity for those rendering aid or assistance in emergency situations. This type of legislation seems to be
predicated on the beliefs that some medical
treatment in emergencies is better than none
at all, and that today's physicians are so
conscious of their legal liability in an emergency situation that they "will pass by on the
other side" unless they are given absolute
assurance beforehand that their wrongful
acts, if any, while attending will not later be
held against them. It is obvious that the
social purpose of Good Samaritan legisla-

tion, however, is not to shield the physician
from the legal consequences of his wrongful
acts. The real beneficiary, if there be one, of
Good Samaritan laws is the victim of an accident or other emergency who is helpless
and in critical need of immediate medical
assistance. And there are doubtless specific
instances where no Good Samaritan has
acted because he was fearful of the possibility of suit for doing so. Yet one may question the soundness of a law which seeks to
further a policy of humanitarianism by releasing a tort-feasor from his obligation to
respond in civil damages for his wrongful
acts.
The March 1964 issue of Case and Cominent contains an article on the same legislation by Albert Averbach. In it he states
that lawyers concerned with advising local,
county, state and national medical societies
or groups need to carefully study the impact
upon the public image of the doctor of such
legislative activities and advises against attempted enactment of Good Samaritan
laws. A recent example of forthright action
upon the part of counsel was the handling
by the New York State Medical Society of a
resolution from one of the county medical
societies recommending that the state society petition the Legislature of the State of
New York to enact
a law by which physicians giving first aid in
accident cases without compensation shall
not be liable to malpractice claims arising
out of the rendering of such care. New
York State Journal of Medicine, September

1, 1960, p. 56.
It is reported in the annual meeting of the
state society
that the reference committee has had the
benefit of counsel's opinion, which is that
malpractice actions arising from purely
emergency cases in this State are exceed-

10
ingly rare, that legislative enactment of a
law such as this resolution proposes is very
unlikely, and such a law is of doubtful constitutionality. Accordingly, disapproval of
this resolution is recommended. Id. at 151.
Governor Rockefeller, in his veto of such
legislation, used the following pertinent language:
The sponsors argue that the bill is necessary
to counteract an 'unprecedented increase' in
malpractice actions growing out of situations where a doctor, in an emergency,
away from proper medical equipment, vol-

untarily lends assistance.
It represents an undesirable lowering of the
standard of accepted conduct which has
prevailed for many years.
...

I have sought the opinions of authorities

in the field of tort law. Professors Fowler V.
Harper and Fleming James, authorities in
the field, have commented: 'As a matter of
tort liability of physicians for malpractice,

it is our view as teachers and scholars in the
field of Torts that the liability should be the

same whether medical service is rendered
gratuitously or for compensation and regardless of whether the situation involves
an emergency or not.'
The Individual
Ian Brownlie, writing in the current issue
of the Virginia Law Review, makes an excellent current survey of the place of the individual in international law.
Historically, the individual's status in international law has been closely tied to his
state. While there have been some changes
in this traditional relationship because of the
influence of the United Nations and other
multi-state organizations, the individual's
"place" on the stage of world law remains
generally diverse and, on the whole, prospective in nature. In this survey of many of
the legal relations of the individual, the author gives perspective to the individual's
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"place" and indicates some of the obstacles
in the path of those who would reform
existing institutions.
The author concludes it is clear that legal
developments have done much that is constructive, but it is equally clear that political
conditions determine the extent and permanence of the progress made in terms of legal
obligations and institutions. Three points
may be made to place the problem of the
individual in international relations in perspective. Theoretical controversy as to
whether the individual is a subject of the
law is not always very fruitful in practical
terms, and the issue is always viewed with
the idea of proving that he is a subject vel
non. He probably is in particular contexts,
although some would say that this is true
only when he has true procedural capacity.
The second point is that the individual
must be seen in the context of the organized
community in which he lives and, therefore,
his individual condition will depend on general social and economic advancement in
that community. Some very difficult issues
at once arise which are not solved by general formulae of the conventional kind about
human rights. A government may desire to
control the economy of the state and to
create a public sector which, in its view, is
necessary to proper economic growth. If full
compensation must be paid (and the human
rights of the investors and corporations concerned are to be protected in this way), nationalization on any scale is impossible at
least on "prompt and adequate" terms.
There is then a collision of interests which
may (on the views of some governments,
including governments which are not ideologically Communist) be resolved at the expense of the human rights of the national
community as a whole. Finally, whether it
is palatable or not, many states in the Gen-
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eral Assembly of the United Nations see
human rights issues as bound up with community rights to self-determination: the
Charter is concerned with the equality of
states and peoples. -Self-determination and
racial equality are prominent issues in the
world forum, as evidenced by the attitude of
the majority of member states toward South
Africa.
For the future, work on individual human
rights may tend towards a synthesis of the
"civil liberties" model and programs of
social and economic advancement for communities devastated by poverty. The economic gap between the industrial nations
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they produce are cumulative; and if they
continue unabated, they can silently rewrite
30
even the fundamental law of the nation.

istered, and the patient recovers or dies, the
issue of conflicting rights becomes moot.
Refusal to hear a case for this reason
greatly enlarges a judge's authority since,
upon the issuance of an order, he would
know that his reasoning or authority would
not be subject to review by reason of future
mootness. Such actions are not infrequently
attempted, as Mr. Justice Douglas has
stated:
History shows that governments bent on a
crusade, or officials filled with ambitions
have usually been inclined to take short-cuts
...the demand for quick and easy justice
mounts. These short-cuts are not as flagrant perhaps as a lynching. But the ends
rence, especially if public rights are concerned.
ROBERTSON
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and the Afro-Asian world is widening, and
legal development should responsibly reflect
the most urgent needs of the world today.
The "right of property" has no great appeal
to states who want what they call economic
self-determination; talk of human rights is
not entirely pertinent with regard to individuals with interests in powerful corporations. To some readers this will no doubt
seem invidious, but recognition that these
areas of acute controversy exist is necessary
if we are not to become complacent about
those peripheral advances, like the European Convention, which tend to monopolize
the attention of many jurists.
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In the area of the conflicting interests of
the religious freedom of the individual and
the police power of the state, there appears
to be an increasing need for the higher
courts to formulate definitive standards,
thereby providing concrete guidelines for
the lower courts to follow. Movement
toward such clarity will only be hampered
or stagnated by the mootness argument, and
can be defeated by "short-cuts" or "quick
and easy justice" on the part of a judge
issuing an order compelling medical treatment. Historical and constitutional precedent would seem to require that courts determine that it is only within the areas of
general welfare and parens patriaein which
the state may order medical treatment
against the wishes of an adult patient.
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(1951); see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§
1354 (I), (3) (1958).

30Douglas, A Challenge to the Bar, 28 NOTRE
DAME LAW.

497-98 (1953).

